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“The fog,” Puck cartoon by Will Crawford, 1911, Library of Congress.

U.S. ANTITRUST: FROM SHOT IN THE
DARK TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
David J. Gerber

W

hen the United States
Congress enacted the
first “antitrust” law in
1890 it was taking a shot in the dark.
At the time there was no concept of
“antitrust law”—i.e., a general legal regime intended to combat restraints on competition. Today more
than 100 countries have such laws,
including all significant participants
in the global economy. Competition
law has become a major factor in economic life throughout much of the
world. U.S. antitrust law has played
a central role in this remarkable evolution, and it is generally acknowledged to be the most important of

these laws. It is the touchstone and
frame of reference for international
discussions, and it is often used as
a model or at least a major source
of guidance by other countries in
developing their own competition
laws. The story is extraordinary, interwoven with the roles of power
and ideas and intertwined with the
evolution of the U.S. and its role in
the world. This brief essay sketches
its trajectory. Chicago-Kent’s role as
an educational institution tracks that
trajectory.
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I. A Shot in the Dark

T

his new type of legislation was
a “shot in the dark” in the sense
that few, if any, of the legislators had
any way of knowing what consequences the legislation would have.
They were “shooting” at something,
but they didn’t know what they
might actually hit. So what were they
trying to do and why?
Antitrust law was, above all, a
response to social turbulence and
tensions. The United States in the
1880s presented a complex mixture
of hope, fear and resentments. The
terrible Civil War was a memory,
but not a distant one. Rapid industrialization was creating great wealth
for a few and jobs for many. Immigration was bringing millions from
Europe to take those jobs and to find
land to farm in the Midwest and the
West. Yet the rapid changes also generated sectional conflicts and social
tensions, and political and legal institutions strained to respond effectively to them.
This mixture of pressures, conflicts and resentments led Congress
to enact what came to be known as
antitrust law. One key background
factor was the resentment that many
felt towards the new super rich and
their lavish and ostentatious lifestyles. Located primarily in New
York and other cities on the East
Coast, these groups had achieved
great wealth quickly, often through
control of large manufacturing busi-
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nesses. These firms often dominated
specific industries, and this dominance allowed them to exclude new
entrants from those industries. It
also allowed them to extract what
many viewed as unfair prices and
conditions on their suppliers as well
as their employees. This led to anger at the power of these so-called
“trusts” and often combined with
anger at the power of their owners
to control the destinies and stifle
the possibilities of others, especially
those in other parts of the country.
A specific catalyst for antitrust law
was rising anger among Midwestern
farming communities at what they
saw as rapacious and monopolistic
conduct by railroad companies and
others whom they believed were
manipulating prices paid to farmers for their grain and livestock.
Groups representing these interests
pressured their representatives in
Congress to do something about the
“trusts” that were amassing fortunes
for a few, but exploiting vast numbers of hard-working farmers and
tradesmen.
Congress responded to this
pressure by enacting the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1890. The name
that soon attached to the legislation—“anti-trust”—reflected its goals.
It was a tool to be used to combat the
monopolistic abuses of very large
enterprises. There was, however, no
model for Congress to use in doing
what it wanted to do—or wanted
to appear to be doing. So Congress
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“punted”—it simply federalized two
barely used legal principles. It took
two concepts from the common law
that had been used for quite different
purposes, first in England and then
to a limited extent in the U.S., and it
made them enforceable under federal law. The statute was very short,
and its basics have not changed since
1890. The first concept was “restraint
of trade.” This concept had been
used primarily in civil cases to combat overly restrictive provisions in
contracts. The second basic idea was
“monopolization.” It had also been
part of the English common law, but
for centuries it had been little used
in either England or the U.S. The legislation contained virtually no guidance as to the substantive content of
the provisions, leaving issues of content to the federal courts.
The Sherman Act transformed
the role of these private law concepts
by providing that the federal government could enforce them. Congress
appears to have given little thought
to how this was to take place. It did
not create specific procedure for the
enforcement of the antitrust provisions. It merely authorized the U.S.
Justice Department to file claims in
the regular courts, using the normal
rules for civil proceedings. Given that
the federal government was still very
small in 1890, the legislators could
hardly have envisioned extensive
federal administrative application of
the provisions. Some assumed that
private actions could be brought on

the basis of the legislation, and this
was confirmed a few years later.
This was the “shot in the dark!”
The U.S. Congress was responding
to specific domestic pressures. The
legislators just took common law
concepts and gave the federal government authority to use them in
the federal courts. The legislators
paid little, if any, attention to how
others in the world had dealt with
similar issues or what, if anything,
they might think about the U.S. experiment. They just experimented,
basically relying on judges to sort
out the issues and develop the law.
II. An Antitrust System Develops

P

rior to the Second World War
the system evolved slowly and
fitfully according to a pragmatic,
court-based process—typical of U.S.
legal development generally. The
judges were solving the conflicts before them, and there is little evidence
that they thought about their decisions as creating a “system” of antitrust law. They relied on accumulated practical experience, domestic
conceptions of the judicial role, and
often on ideologies about the role
of markets as they shaped the content and roles of antitrust in the U.S.
There were relatively few cases, and
other than in a few large companies
there was relatively little interest in
this area of the law.
After the war the roles and importance of antitrust law expanded
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greatly. One factor was transnational. Antitrust came to be seen in
the U.S. as a part of a global “mission” to provide an antidote to fascism and to support freedom. Many
believed that the concentrations of
economic power in Germany and
Japan were at least in part responsible for the horrors of the Second
World War, and they saw antitrust
as a means of preventing such concentrations or at least curbing the
resulting abuses. This led U.S. government officials and others actively
to promote antitrust in Europe. A
European version of antitrust law
had begun to develop in the 1920s,
but it had not gained much status in
most European countries, and thus
U.S. antitrust became a symbol of restructuring in Europe, both in individual countries and in connection
with the process of European integration. At the same time, the economic and political dominance of
the U.S. in the so-called “free world”
allowed the U.S. to apply its antitrust
law to conduct outside its own territory and thus further support the
antitrust mission.
This heightened political, symbolic and economic importance of
antitrust on the international plane
combined with the de facto protection of the U.S. market encouraged
rapid growth in the perceived importance of antitrust within the U.S. and
the expansion of antitrust principles.
By the early 1970s antitrust had become a very important part of the
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legal environment of business and as
such it attracted strong interest from
lawyers. The growing importance of
antitrust meant that law schools increased their offerings in the area.
According to Ralph Brill, antitrust was
first taught at Chicago-Kent College
of Law in 1973. This also meant, however, that antitrust represented a major
cost for many U.S. businesses. These
costs were tolerated as long as economic factors (especially currency and regulatory obstacles) buffered U.S. firms
from international competition.
In the 1970s the international
economic picture changed markedly,
and these changes in global economic conditions generated a fundamental change in U.S. antitrust law. The
“oil shocks” of the early 1970s and the
concomitant international currency
restructuring led to increased awareness in the U.S. business community of the need for U.S. businesses to
compete internationally. Antitrust
now began to appear as a burden on
the U.S. economy, and this led scholars to examine ever more carefully
the intellectual justification for such
burdens. Economists and law professors increasingly argued that the
courts had expanded antitrust law
too far and that the entire edifice of
antitrust law should be viewed from
the perspective of its economic impact. This perspective quickly won
favor in the courts and law faculties,
and within a few years it led to a radical revision of standards for antitrust
law in the U.S. The central substantive
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law questions were now to be judged
by economists according to economic
criteria.
III. Global Competition Law Leadership

T

he “shot in the dark” that was
the U.S. antitrust law system is
today no longer solely a domestic
field of law. It is now also a critically important component of global
economic policy! The system that
U.S. judges had evolved to deal with
purely domestic problems and that
relied on little more than confidence
in the capacity of courts to develop reasonable responses to conflicts has been transformed into the
central player in efforts to respond
effectively to economic and other
forms of globalization. It is now a
U.S. export product, and the stakes
are enormous. What directions and
forms will the rules of competition
take? Treatment of these issues will
be a factor in the future of many
countries, including the U.S., and
for more than two decades Chicago-Kent has brought transnational
competition law to our students, and
Chicago-Kent faculty have contributed to the international discussion
of these issues.
A. Foreign Interactions and Perceptions
U.S. antitrust now plays on a
global stage, and much will depend

on how foreign experts, lawyers,
government officials and business
leaders see U.S. antitrust. They will
make decisions about what to do in
their own countries and on the international level. This means that their
perspectives on the U.S. system are
critical to its roles both at home and
abroad, and foreign images of U.S.
antitrust have changed radically. Prior
to the Second World War, those in
Europe who knew anything about
U.S. antitrust law (and they were
few) generally considered it a mistake. They tended to see it as a failure that actually created more harm
than good by forcing companies to
merge rather than cooperate. This
view predominated in large measure
until after the Second World War.
The Europeans were developing a
different concept of competition law
that emphasized administrative control of dominant firms. This conception of competition was spreading
rapidly in Europe in the 1920s, but
depression and war led to its virtual
abandonment.
After that war ended, however,
U.S. antitrust law became associated
with U.S. economic dominance in
the “free world.” The real and imagined connections between economic
concentration and military expansion in both Germany and Japan
convinced many that U.S.-style antitrust law should be used to combat
such concentrations. U.S. occupation forces in Germany and Japan
imposed U.S. antitrust ideas during
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the occupation period, and the U.S.
insisted that both countries either
enact or maintain competition law
after the occupation. This increased
awareness of these ideas abroad.
Perhaps more important, however,
was the perception that antitrust
was a source of strength for the U.S.
economy and thus a potential spur
to growth that other countries could
employ.
U.S.-style antitrust did not, however, always fit well with European
legal traditions and institutions, and
in most European countries skepticism toward the U.S. model limited
progress in protecting competition.
In Germany, however, a separate set
of ideas about how to protect competition developed in the 1930s and
1940s in the underground, and after the war it became the basis for
German antitrust law. From here
it spread to the European level and
became part of the process of European integration. The basic idea of

U.S. antitrust law—i.e., protecting
the competitive process from restraints—was part of this model of
competition law, but the model itself
was conceptually and institutionally
quite distinct. European scholars and
officials in these areas often looked
to U.S. antitrust for comparisons and
insights into problems, but there was
relatively little interaction between
U.S. and European forms of competition law until the 1990s.
In the 1990s these relationships
became far closer and more important for both the U.S. and Europeans. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet
Union precipitated widespread interest in market-based approaches
around the world and revived the
messianic tenor of the U.S. antitrust
law community. Many countries
that had socialist or other command-based approaches to the organization of economic activity now
introduced antitrust laws or significantly increased their investment in
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the enforcement of such laws. Often
they looked to U.S. antitrust officials,
lawyers and scholars for help in implementing or evaluating their new
activities.
B. Policy Issues and Obstacles
This has raised a critically important issue: How will/should
competition law on global markets
be implemented? Globalization has
shown the limitations and distortions of the traditional jurisdictional
system—e.g., differing rules and
procedures for different parts of the
same economic market. Many in
the U.S. and elsewhere believe that
the best response to these problems
is to encourage all countries to follow at least the basic substantive law
approach of the U.S. antitrust law
system. This would generate convergence among competition law systems around the world and reduce
the harms caused by current jurisdictional arrangements. Many others are,
however, skeptical that the U.S. model
should be the focus of convergence.
They often see some form of coordination (perhaps at the World Trade Organization level) as the best response.
How these foreign decision makers and decision shapers understand
and evaluate U.S. antitrust law is
critical to this set of decisions. It is
important, therefore, that they understand as clearly as possible how
U.S. antitrust law works and what
the guiding ideas are behind the law.

Only then will they be in a position
adequately to evaluate it, compare
it with their own systems and make
informed choices in relation to it.
There are many obstacles—linguistic, comparative, political and economic—to achieving an adequate
understanding of the U.S. system
and of the implications of various
policy choices for the global system
and for individual components of it.
Moreover, it is critical that U.S. lawyers, officials and scholars acquire a
better understanding of the competition law elsewhere and thus of the
potential bases for convergence and
coordination on the global level.
IV. Concluding Comments

A

former U.S. antitrust official not
long ago wrote that U.S. antitrust is (or could be) the “light of the
world.” That might be a bit strong,
but U.S. antitrust certainly does play
a key role in the development of the
global economy and its many components. Now the big question is
whether U.S. legal thinking and the
creative and pragmatic impulses that
have been so much a part of U.S. antitrust law will continue to provide
the leadership that can make the
most of these opportunities.
These changes have important
implications for U.S. legal education.
At Chicago-Kent College of Law,
we are doing our part. Here, and
at some other leading law schools,
these issues have generated increas-
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ing attention. Since the 1980s, and
even more so since the early 1990s, I and
others have included transnational issues
in the domestic antitrust course and
included an antitrust focus in courses
such as international business transactions. I have also long offered a
seminar in international and comparative antitrust law that tackles
these issues directly. These efforts
have two central objectives. One is
to educate U.S. lawyers to perform
more effectively in this new global
context. The other is to educate foreign lawyers about U.S. antitrust law
and provide them with tools for understanding and evaluating it and its
global roles.
One fact stands out in 2013 at the
celebration of Chicago-Kent’s 125
years of teaching law. The U.S. will
have to earn its leading role in antitrust law on the global level. Effective legal education in this area will
be a key element in whether it will be
successful in achieving that goal. ◆
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